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Legal Regulation of the Connection of the co-operative 
with its Members 
In Hungary, public opinion is today keenly interested in the formation 
of the external and internal interest relations of co-operatives. Within this 
theme, of wide-ranging and complex character, I want to deal with the 
internal side of the legal projection of the co-operative interest relations, i.e. 
with the problems of the connection system between the co-operative and its 
members, relevant to legal relations. So much the more, because as far as 
the interest relations of the co-operative interest structure became more 
complicated and differentiated, the internal connection system has got at least 
so much coloured and articulated, too. And even, I venture to mention in 
advance a thesis to be verified later, namely that the connection system 
between the co-operative and its members can only be taken out from the 
scope of the co-operative interest relations and from the interconnected outer 
interest junctions, in order to investigate into them. 
Economics considers the intérest as such a relation between man and his 
environment, the aim of which is: to fill the current needs and which 
connects the individual by this to society (Kálmán Szabó). The question is, 
to what extent the law can regulate the given interest relation. In order to 
emhasize the complexity of the problem — apart from the details — let me 
allow to refer to Imre Szabó and Gyula Eörsi. Szabó writes: "The interest 
itself, taken alone and for the law, as well, is a too general and too abstract 
concept to that its social content could be immediately evident. Its appearance, 
practical manifestation take place in the shape -of pairs of antinomies; 
opposite to the private interest is the public interest, to the individual interest 
the social interest . . . " etc.1 In Erösi's formulation: " . . . t he re are, at first, the 
economic relations, from this outgrow the political targets, and the law is 
only achieved when, transcribing the political aims into the law, they 
formulate the legal targets, creating the legal norm which in the social-
economic relations induces the homogenized, impoverished legal relations, 
reflecting the reality in a distorted way."2 
Eörsi finally solves the antinomy, saying: "The transcription into the law 
transplants the inactment of the target by the State into the legal system, 
in order that the law can become an implement to realize the target."3 
1 Szabó, Imre: A jogelmélet alapjai (Bases of the legal theory). Akadémiai Ki-
adó, Budapest, 1971, p. 75. 
2 Eörsi, Gyula: Jogelméleti torzó (A torso in the legal theory). Állam- és Jog-
tudomány, 1980, vol. XXIII). — p. 333. 
3 Eörsi, Gyula: Op. cit., p. 372. 
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Nevertheless, I should say that starting at the line of economy-interest-
ideology, and of the political sphere, the "transcription into the law" is not 
always perfect. More exactly, the law does not always register satisfactorily 
the emerging tendencies in the optimum moment of recognizing them. 
Fixing the fact, formulated in this way, I should like to come to 
investigating in greater detail the system of connection between the co-
operative and its members. I myself, as well, support the staindpoint, according 
to which in addition to the independent and separated co-operative interest, 
there is the individual interest of the member of co-operative. And even, 
recently, the interest of small-groups within the co-operative also demands 
a legal regulation corresponding to them. And these pairs of interests mean 
the basis of an internal system of connections.4 
It follows, however, from the concept of the structure of interest, as 
well, that the groups of relations, appearing in the structure of interests — 
independently of whether they are external or internal, as compared to the 
co-operative — determine also the system of connection between the co-
operative and its members. Let us think of the changes in the content of 
membership relations, and not ultimately of the effects connected with 
accepting the small groups, appearing actually within the group (co-operative) 
interest as. independent points of junction, colouring the content of the co-
operative membership. 
It is today already a widely accepted opinion that the division, connected 
with the double position of the co-operative member (as an employee resp. 
owner) — corresponding to the objective circumstances — should be 
amplified and, according to this, the interestedness of the co-operative 
member is already determined by three components, namely: the undertaking 
of work (co-operation in another co-operative in some activities), small-
enterprise (including household, farming, too), and financial co-operation. The 
system of connections, between co-operative and its members adjusts, 
therefore, itself to the changes in the structure of interests, the determinant 
of which is, on the other hand, the formation of social-economic relations. 
Just therefore the statement, according to which the system of connection 
between the co-operative and its members has — in addition to its inner 
side — an outer side, as well: does not lose touch with reality. 
The member of a co-operative, as a national, may-belong to more than 
one system of connections. As the co-operative, as well, accomplishes its tasks 
not only concentrated to its members, the form ot the social-economic 
existence of the members of the co-operative is not exclusively the co-
operative, either. The scope of the social-economic duties of the co-operative 
— as mentioned in the special literature, as well —-is inside and outside the 
co-operative, because, with its means and possibilities, it may serve as a higher 
basis .for other small-holder units, too, without being to the detriment of the 
common activity.5 On the other hand, the productive, servicing activities of 
the' member of the co-operative • does not remain -always in the framework 
of the co-operative, either. Therefore, the points of junction of the structure 
of interests, their structural and functional changes have — even if indirectly 
— an effect on the role and situation of members in the systems of connection 
inside and outside the Co-operative. Formulating more simply, there appear 
« Nagy, László: A szövetkezeti jog alapkérdései (Fundamental questions of thé 
co-operative law). Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1977. 
already today, in addition to the inter-co-operative system of connections, the 
outer systems of connections, as well, supposing at any rate the former one, 
too (e.g. the activity in other co-operatives, the secondary husbanding, the 
economic working party etc.), in which the members appear as subjects of 
a legal relation, as regulated by the law. 
The inner side of the system of connection between the co-operation and 
its members is, therefore, the content of the membership relation: its outer 
side, on the other hand, is the system of conditions which provides an 
opportunity for the co-operative member to establish a legal relation 
expressing a system of non-co-operative connections, and the activity within 
the framework of it. 
After these, I should really like to some legal questions of the 
system of connection between the co-operative and its members. Before doing 
this, however, I should like to remark that alluring as may be to approach 
the given theme from economic, sociological aspects and from that of the 
theory of organizing, yet, I consider it as right to remain at investigating 
into the method — at any rate neglected of late — given by the legal 
regulation, so much the more, as it is an experimental fact that the 
theoretical conceptions and legal solutions not only that not always converge 
but there are, as well, essential contradictions, to be found between them. 
The first question can only be — in my opinion — how the law is able 
to express and regulate the system of connections between the co-operative 
and its members. 
The interests of co-operatives — first of all of those of producing type 
— are indicated by their aims and by the scope of their tasks, realizing these. 
The interests of the members of co-operatives are ensured by their positions 
in the co-operative. The division, indicated in the double position should also 
be amplified. Thus, the position of the owner, which was earlier 
overshadowed, has today two well-sensible domains of appreciation: the 
household farming, forming an organic unit with farming on a large scale, 
the pecuniary co-operation, supposing the financial interest of the owner. 
I think, at any rate, that the widening of interested fields, the possibility of 
a new division, were made possible by the position of owner. 
As to how many hindering factors impeded, and are impeding even today, 
clearsightedness in this field, I should like to refer to an economist who 
explains in connection with the structural situation of agricultural co-
operatives: "Those dealing with the development of social structure in a 
village are for years not unified in deciding whether the membership relation 
of co-operatives, i.e. the micro-structuré, based on the co-operative ownership, 
contains any peculiarity in the agricultural structure, by which it may be 
dintiguished from that of state farms. Both the positive and the negative 
standpoints are only based on a supposition."6 He regrets to establish that 
in* Hungary there is going on no research work which would take into 
consideration, at the principles of group formation, the ownership relations, 
too, to be found within agriculture. At the same time, it is a fact that the 
5 Seres, Imre: A termelőszövetkezeten belüli viszonyok főbb jogi kérdései 
(Major legal questions of the relations within productive co-operatives). A J ATE 
Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar Mezőgazdasági és Munkajogi Tanszékének Kiadványai 
4. Szeged, 1979. 
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structural relations of the workers of agricultural co-operatives are influenced 
by the relation of members or employees, as well. 
At regulating the law of co-operatives, therefore, we should take for our 
basis the connection of interests within the co-operatives, supposing one 
another and built on one another and the objective claims of interest-
structures, reflecting the socio-economic reality, should not be put into shade. 
I have not the slightest intention, to deal unceasingly under the key-words 
"the syster of connection beween the co-operative and its members" with the 
problems of the membership relation, repeated over and over again. But — 
I think — the interested experts look time after time for an answer to the 
question, how the system of multipolar connections can be comprehended and 
regulated by the law. There are, namely, generally known the opinions, held 
to be extreme, which either narrow down resp. transform into labour relation 
the institution of membership relations or degrade it to be negligible resp. a 
mosaic-like legal relation. 
An interesting and original theoretical conception has appeared about the 
institutionalization of the managing system of work organizations — which 
can be formed in the framework of the so-called collective laws (labour law, 
law of productive co-operatives) legalized, i.e. adjusted to the interest 
structure, recognized (appreciated) in the main lines of the collective — and 
of the relation between the collective and the membership as a 
statusrelation.7 Though, I have to remark that the theory of the independent 
legal entity of the collective was already expounded on the field of the 
Hungarian labour law by Andor Weltner, in his monograph, entitled "A szo-
cialista munkajogivszony és az üzemi demokrácia" (The socialist labour-law 
relations and factory democracy) more than twenty years ago, saying: "if we 
take into consideration the field of the entire legal system, besides the man. 
the State, and the civil-law person, the collective, too, takes place, as a 
particular subject of labour law."8 And the idea of duplicity of the status and 
labour relations was raised by Ferenc Erdei in 1968, in his lecture, introducing 
a discussion, entitled "Theoretical questions of co-operatives", conceived as 
follows: "The fundamental question which should still be cleared in a long 
debate is, whether the membership relation itself in the productive co-
operation determines the labour-relation of members in the collective work of 
the co-operative or the participation in the common work requires the 
creation of separate labour relations."9 
The fundamental problem may only be, in my opinion, whether the legal 
relationship of co-operative membership may comprehend in their totality 
the internal, i.e. co-operative connections of the co-operative and its members, 
more exactly: arrange the system of co-operative connections well. It is 
another question, whether the organization and system of means, resp. the 
« Zsarnóczai, Sándor: A mezőgazdasági szövetkezetek dolgozóinak strukturális 
helyzetéről (On the structural, situation of members and employees of agricultural 
co-operatives). Közgazdasági Szemle, 1979. No. 1, pp. 76-82. 
7 Hegedűs, István: A kollektíva jogi felelőssége a jogágak fejlődési távlataiban 
(Legal liability of the collective in the developmental perspective of the branches 
of law). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1982. No. 6, pp. 452-459. 
s Weltner, Andor: A szocialista munkajogviszony és az üzemi demokrácia 
(Socialist labour-law relations and workshop democracy). Akadémiai Kiadó, Buda-
pest, 1962, p. 381. 
9 Erdei, Ferenc: A szövetkezetek elméleti kérdései (Theoretical questions of 
co-operatives). Társadalmi Szemle, 1968. No. 2, p. 35. 
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mechanism, necessary to this, is given at present. Before giving an 
unambiguously affirmative answer to this, allow me to refer to an easily 
demonstrable process. While in labour law, as mentioned, there have been 
made some attempts for more than 20 years to amplify the content of labour 
relations, to widen the rights of the collective: in the co-operative law the 
claims present themselves in the elaboration of the organization of the 
indirect democracy (e.g. widening the scope of activities of the meating of 
delegates etc.), formulating rights and duties of the managing and work-
organizational units, becoming independent, in the connection of interests of 
the employer (owner) and employees. In the Hungarian labour law, we may, 
therefore, be the witnesses of a process of integration. And in the co-operative 
law, the claim to an internal differentiation is preceptible for the sake of 
guaranteeing the organizational life. 
It is true that the first step towards the organization of enterprisal law 
was made — nolens-volens — by the co-operative law.10 And even, it is to ba 
emphasized that the system of connection between the co-operative and its 
members was made an organic unit by the theory of co-operative law, what 
has had its effect on the development of labour law. The practical experts 
observe, however, hardly the conception of enterprisal law or co-operative law, 
and the least of all that of collective law in the course of making the law, 
to say nothing of the application of law. On the other hand, as mentioned 
above, the theory and law-making do not only not harmonize with each other 
but between the two even a certain divergence presents itself. 
If we accept as a thesis the establishment, according to which system of 
connection between the co-operative and its members is determined by the 
tendencies of economic interest — economic policy, "the transcription into 
the law" ought to serve the mentioned tendencies — even if the means are 
restricted. This role of service — as I see this — cannot be observed 
unambiguously either in labour law or in co-operative law. 
I would only mention one or two examples. One of the central fields of 
the system of connections is the systematic performance of a work. The co-
operative member is, however, in the productive co-operative not only a 
workshop but he is within the co-operative management quasi an owner-
enterpreneur, as well. This duplicity ought to be regulated by the law in a 
way that these positions create an organic unit and the possibility of the co-
operative enterprise may appeare as a function of performing the work in 
te workshop. The co-operative differs namely from the national enterprise just 
therin that, in case of the former, the ownership relations are more 
immediate and, consequently, its earning relations must also be of more 
immediate character. 
Or let us take, e.g., the financial co-operation as another important field 
of the membership interestedness and, through this, that of the inner system 
of connections. The expression: financial contribution óf the co-operative 
member, resp. the financial connections between co-operative and its member, 
do not overlap each other exactly. The latter is evidently a wider concept but 
the legally regulated financial connection has similarly, two basic types. One 
of them presents itself as the content of the cooperative membership relation. 
10 Cf. in detail in: Sárközi, Tamás: A vállalati jog, mint jogágazat problémájá-
hoz (To the problem of the enterprisal law, as a branch of law). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1979. No. 19, pp. 795-805. 
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the other is independent of the membership relation — being only coloured 
by that, to wich we shall return in short. 
As to the inner financial connections, these are, unfortunately, partly not 
in every case functions of a systematical performance of a work, partly the 
legal regulation itself does not pay any major attention to the financial 
connections of economic and managing character between the co-operative 
and its members, either. If, therefore, we want to fortify the financial co-
operative character of productive co-operatives (may these be industrial or 
agricultural) we should assert instead of the principle of coexistence that of 
collectivity. Our effort should be that both the co-operative and the co-
operative member having a "separate property" be more interested in the 
economic, financial integration. It is a separate question, what new forms of 
co-operation can be realized. 
Finishing the examples, I should also mention the existence and 
regulation of the "small-group" interests. We may experience that the small-
group interests, growing in strength owing to the concentration of co-
operatives, find the forms of asserting themselves even if these do not always 
correspond to the requirements of the socialist structure of interests; and the 
working-site collectives are not only the organizational forms of co-operative 
democracy but also those of the prevailing of the collective interest relations. 
My opinion was, earlier too, that the organizational skeleton of the large co-
operatives is not hardened su much, as yet, that they could not be flexible 
by growing their interestedness and the assumption of risks, without vertebral 
fracture. On the other hand, we see that the legal regulation is statisfied with 
recognizing the organizational framework of the rights of status, without 
making any mention of their widening or of the transformation of work-
organizations into economic organizations with relative independence or of 
the possibility of their duplicity. For instance, it does not refer to such and 
undertaking within the co-operative, in which the member enterpreneur 
makes his unit function approximately with the interestedness of the owner 
but it does this in an economic system which ensures that the personal profit 
of the enterpreneur be, at the same time, the profit of the whole collective, 
as well. 
I have the feeling that we recently express the reality, the objective 
socio-economic development in a too complicate way and, when we speak of 
husbanding, interest, economic policy, regulation then, behind the obscure 
formulations, uncertainty, the lack of careful examination hide themselves, 
It would be good if we, first of all, exactly formulated the objective forces 
that unambiguously show the way to the legal regulation, as well. It would 
be good, not to mystify the connections between the co-operative and its 
members. These are, namely, seen by all clear-headed co-operative members. 
The formation of socio-economic relations is reflected in the inner 
connections. The tsfsk for the law may only be, to promote the development, 
the better possibilities optimistically. It is not questionable for anyone that the 
inner connections form a uniform system in which the connection of work, 
undertaking, interests, the social and individual consciousness are decisive 
factors. Just therefore — I am convinced — the co-operative law should 
regulate this system in its whole, in the framework of the system of legal 
relations, so that the co-operatives get even more possibility to realize their 
expectations but — in addition — so that the interests of the co-operative, 
the small-group and those of individuals do not lose touch with one another, 
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as well as the co-operative economy should also not lose touch with the 
household- and second-farming, the co-operative property with the individual 
one, the co-operative cosciousness with the individual one. 
As a conclusion, I should like to formulate from this point of view a few 
more ideas about the outer side of the system of inner connections, as well. 
As a preliminary, I would emphasize that the system of internal connection 
between co-operative and its member is comprehended not only by the co-
operative law because the member as a national, too, may have legally 
regulated connections with his co-operative, but this domain cannot be the 
subject of our discussion. On the other hand, what is more problematical 
mainly from the point of view of being regulated, it is the outer side of the 
system of the connection of members. 
We proceeded from the thesis that the junctions of interest-structure 
(social, sectoral group, small-group, thinking of the disintegrable individual 
interests) can only be separated from one another in order to analyse them. 
Is this statement true, then the connections of interests both of the co-
operative and its members are not only directed inwards but also outwards. 
As the outer connections of the co-operative have an effect on the system of 
internal connections (the members are similarly interested in the formation 
of the external interest and legal regulations of the co-operative), just as 
much have the outer interest and legal regulations of the ownership and 
financial affairs of members an effect on the co-operative itself. Giving 
prominence to the ownership-side, we should formulate the necessitiy of 
returning the "property of nationals" into the social producing process. 
As to the development of regulation, we should primarily separate the 
external connections which may only be set up, on principle, by the co-
operative members, if they do not hurt with these the interests of the co-
operative (e.g. the small-commodity producting outer connections of specialized 
groups, of household farming) and outside the co-operative (e.g., activity in 
other co-operatives, participation in an economic working pool etc.) which are 
generally characterized by the primacy of corporate interests, that is to say, 
by the prescription of permit for creating such a connection. 
There belong to the second group the outer connections which are 
independent, i.e. not of function character. In these, the national appears as 
an owner and free enterpreneur (e.g. if the work was done in the second 
economy, in the free time etc.). The regulation of these two — in my opinion 
often mixed — spheres, from the point of view of social interest is, perhaps, 
the most problematical but, at the same time, the most timely problem. We 
are at a loss, seeing the phenomenon, which manifests itself, on the one 
hand, in the overregulation of common activity (the work done in common), 
in the narrow, financial approach of the pecuniary connections and, on the 
other hand, in the bold, grandiose tratment of the possible giving back of the 
wealth of nationals. Or is it still a fancy seeming too bold, to connect the 
income, acquired fundamentally with work, with the co-operative estate in a 
way that the former one should take part in some way in the co-operative 
production and that this participation — in addition to assuming and running 
the risk — can give (even if in a restricted way) some share to the co-
operative member and the national, connected with the co-operative economy. 
The realization of this conception would not mean any thing else than the 
secondary returning of the income, acquired with work, through the co-
operative. The work of the national is, namely, manifested in this share, too. 
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Against the innumerable counter-arguments a single argument, ref lect ing 
reality, can only be offered, namely that if the thesis is right, according to 
which, instead of coexistence, the principle of collectivity is to be realized in 
practice and not only the common ecomony should help the individual or 
second economy, connected wi th it, then the connection of the t w o properties, 
being beside each other, in this w a y augments not only the individual but 
also the common economy. I am convinced that the legal regulation of the 
future wi l l promote this tendency, as well . 
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